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Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Militia Violence, Amnesty and Energy Security 
 
Ibaba Samuel Ibaba 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the interface between violence in the Niger Delta, global energy 
security and amnesty granted to armed groups by the Nigerian government. The author 
notes the impact of the violence on energy infrastructure and brings to the fore how the 
violence endangers energy security. Thus far, a major concern is that the amnesty program 
will fail because it was not preceded by negotiations between the government and 
combatants. The author questions this view and points outs that before the amnesty 
proclamation, several negotiations through committees and commissions involving 
stakeholders had been done. The paper thus argues that it cannot be entirely correct to 
conclude that there were no negotiations before the amnesty program was proclaimed. 
Further, it argues that the issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure of 
government to tackle the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict. The deepening of 
the country’s democracy to ensure that votes count at elections is seen as the most likely 
option to guarantee the success of the amnesty program and secure the region and energy 
security. 
 
Introduction 
The Niger Delta, Africa’s largest delta (World Bank 1995) and home of Nigeria’s 
oil industry, has in the past two decades been characterized by protracted oil-related 
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violent conflicts. The conflicts began as agitations against oil-producing companies by 
oil-producing communities in the 1970s, and centered on demands for development 
attention, environmental protection, and payment of adequate compensation for damages 
caused by oil company activities such as oil spills. The conflict witnessed several 
transformations, and this elevated the agitations to political demands (such as 
restructuring of the Nigerian federation, resource ownership and self-determination) and 
finally burst into full blown insurgency in 2005 (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and 
Okhomina 2007; Watts 2007; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009).The literature on the Niger Delta 
has shown concern for the threat the conflicts pose to energy security. One such study 
concludes:  
The oil based struggles for resource benefits and associated conflicts, 
illegal economy and violence has raised security concerns over world oil 
output, shipment and supply. Several times, the economy has led to 
shortfalls in national oil production, world oil supply and consequently 
sporadic increases in world oil prices. There is the fear of terrorists 
attackers, latching on to the social turmoil and illegal and underground 
economy to disrupt world oil supplies. There is also the fear that the 
economy may afflict the West African and Gulf of Guinea oil production 
and existing and potential supplies. To the United States which imports 
about 17 percent of its oil needs from Sub-Saharan Africa and mainly 
from Nigeria, and to whom a stable and diversified oil supply is vital to 
national security, the illegal economy is a serious security concern. 
(Ikelebge 2006, 49)  
 
Although the above reference highlights the impact of the conflict on United States 
energy security, just as some other studies have done (Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz 2007) 
probably because the United States is the largest consumer of Nigerian oil, the implications 
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are wider. The Niger Delta accounts for almost all of Nigeria’s gas and oil production 
(Bassey 2010, 3) and this makes it strategic to global energy needs. It is clear that there is a 
convergence of interest between securing the Niger Delta and the stability of energy needs 
of several countries, including Nigeria. It is also noteworthy that energy and economic 
growth are inexorably linked, and this linkage interfaces with conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding.  
The energy and economic threats posed by the insurgency in the Niger Delta partly 
led to the Nigerian government’s amnesty program, which granted pardon to members of 
militia groups (Niger Delta based non-state armed groups engaged in armed struggle 
against the Nigerian State) whose attacks on oil infrastructure and disruptions in oil 
production led to a drop in Nigeria’s oil production from 2.6 million barrels per day in 
2005 to 1.3 million barrels per day in June 2009 (Obi 2009). The acceptance of the 
amnesty program which ended on October 4, 2009, and the subsequent surrender of arms 
and cessation of attacks on oil infrastructure, have witnessed a rise in oil production to 2.02 
million barrels per day in December 2009 and 2.20 in April 2010 (Central Bank of Nigeria 
2010). 
The objective of this paper is to highlight the importance of the success of the 
amnesty program to global energy security. Concerns have been raised by scholars on the 
success of the amnesty program, and the major one thus far is the lack of negotiation 
between ex-combatants and the state, noted to be a deviation from conventional 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) procedure (Ikelegbe 2010; 
Davidheiser and Kialee 2010; Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi 2010).  But this article makes a 
case that it cannot be totally correct to conclude that the amnesty policy was not preceded 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 47 
by negotiations, noting that the argument ignores the Niger Delta context. Furthermore, the 
issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure to address the fundamental factors 
which instigated the violence. 
The remaining part of the paper is divided into 5 sections. The first, “locating the 
Niger Delta conflict,” examines theoretical explanations for the conflict and highlights the 
trend. The second section, “the conflict and energy security,” reflects on Nigeria’s 
potential and actual strategic role in global energy needs and the implications of the 
violence on energy security; while the third, “reflections on peacebuilding in the Niger 
Delta,” examines efforts by the Nigerian Government towards peace in the region. The 
forth section, “interrogating the amnesty program,” examines the concerns and challenges 
of the amnesty program. The fifth section concludes the study by noting the centrality of 
democratization to the success of the amnesty program, security of the Niger Delta and 
energy security. 
  
Locating the Niger Delta Conflict 
The conflict in the Niger Delta has been linked to the oil and gas resource which 
is found in the region. Over the years, the conflict has been explained from the 
perspectives of greed, grievance, and frustration-aggression. The greed explanation 
follows the stand point of Collier and Hoefflier (2002) who blame conflict and violence 
on conflict entrepreneurs who are driven by economic gains, particularly in the face of 
the availability of capturable natural resources. The grievance perspective, however, 
blames violence on grievances resulting from deprivation. The three strands of the 
grievance theory, relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequality (Murshed 
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and Tadjoeddin 2009, 96-99) are reinforced by the psychology-based frustration- 
aggression theory which sees conflict as the outcome of frustration caused by the gap 
between aspirations and achievements or what it refers to as “want-get-ratio,” “expected 
need satisfaction” and “actual need satisfaction”(Faleti 2006, 47).  
It is clearly difficult to explain the conflict in the Niger Delta from one theoretical 
standpoint, given its multidimensional nature and transformations. Thus conflict analysis 
in the region has witnessed an interface of interpretations by scholars in respect to the 
different conflict settings or phases. Collier (2008, 31) has pointed out that the conflict in 
the delta has evolved from grievance to greed in the last decade, and attributes this to 
competition for the huge inflow of oil revenues by politicians and illegal payments made 
by oil companies to secure production and kidnapped personnel. Watts (2007 and 2008) 
agrees with this by noting the politically motivated struggles for access and control over 
oil wealth and the criminalization of the conflict through oil theft or bunkering. The 
commoditization of violence in the electoral process has encouraged the proliferation of 
arms and cult/militia groups (Joab-Peterside 2005), a viewpoint supported by available 
data which indicates the stealing of $75.1 billion by oil theft syndicates between 2003-
2008 (Gilbert 2010, 59). Ikelegbe (2006) isolates this from the conflict and blames it on 
what he describes as an “economy of conflict” created by conflict entrepreneurs who 
have taken advantage of the disorder created by the violence.  
Ukiwo (2008) sees this as a diversion meant to acquit the Nigerian State from the 
violence, which he blames on horizontal inequalities and socio-political injustices. This 
view is widespread and hinges its position on Nigeria’s centralized federalism and 
ethnicity-based political domination. The explanation is that in Nigeria, national 
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resources and revenue is placed under the control of the federal government, which is 
expected to direct it to the benefit of all the constituent units of the federation. But 
because the state is ethnicized, and the custodians of power use it to pursue their ethnic 
interests, the ethnic groups who are outside the control of political power are denied 
equitable share of national resources. It further argues that the Nigerian State is controlled 
by the major ethnic groups while oil and gas are produced in the homelands of the 
minority ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta.  
Thus, the oil wealth has been transferred for the benefit of the major groups, and 
this explains the development plight of the Niger Delta that has motivated the conflict. 
The transfer was facilitated by the reduction of the derivation component of revenue 
allocation from 50 percent in 1960 to 1.5 percent in 1984. National revenues in Nigeria 
are paid into a single pool called Federation Account, from where revenue is distributed 
to the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local government) based on prescribed 
criteria. One of these is derivation, which stipulates that a percentage of federally 
collected revenue from natural resources should be paid to the states of origin. At 
independence in 1960, derivation was 50 percent, but this was later reduced to 45, 20, 2 
and later 1.5 percent. Protests in the Niger Delta made the government increase it; first to 
3 percent, and later 13 percent (Jega 2007; Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998). 
The reductions which began in 1970 coincided with the ascendance of oil as the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998), which until then 
relied on agricultural products based in the homelands of the majority ethnic groups. This 
deprivation is linked to the grievance which is central to the conflict (Naanen 1995; 
Okoko, Nna, and Ibaba 2006; Adeoye 2010). This is further linked to the paradox where 
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the Niger Delta which accounts for 80 percent of government revenue and 90 percent of 
foreign exchange earnings (Bassey 2010, 3) lacks development. For example, Akinola 
(2010, 56) has noted that: 
In spite of its strategic economic importance, the demographic picture of 
the region as shown by the Human Development Index1 (HDI) is 
deplorable. The HDI of the region is as low as 0.564… Average life 
expectancy in the Niger Delta is 46.8 years. There is also a high mortality 
of young children – of every 1000 newborn, 200 die by the age of 5. 
Access to health was estimated to be available to only 56.5% of the 
population and population per one hospital bed was as high as 1,277 
people…. there is one doctor for every 150,000 inhabitants of the oil rich 
states of Bayelsa and Delta. Similarly, educational attainment at primary 
and secondary levels suffers from a high teacher-pupil ratio – 1:42, 
compared with the national average of 1:36. This, invariably, resulted in a 
large number of drop-outs. At the same time, unemployment is about 30% 
of the available labor force in the region.  
 
The point is that the huge oil revenues have barely benefited the population living 
in poverty (United Nations Development Program 2006), thus leading to anger and 
protests. The frustration-aggression theory reinforces this position. Ibaba (2007) explains 
from this standpoint that dashed hopes of improved living conditions have resulted in 
despair, disillusionment and pent up anger which have motivated the conflicts. But this 
ethnicity-based political domination or horizontal inequality grievance perspective fails to 
explain the different conflict settings adequately. For example, it does not explain the use 
of violence to contest for political power among the political elites in the Niger Delta; 
neither does it explain inter-community and intra-community conflicts. Also, it cannot be a 
useful explanation for inter-ethnic conflicts, intra-cult/militia group and inter-cult/militia 
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group conflict over contests for oil theft/bunkering space and pervasive corruption in the 
region and the interface with development inadequacies and conflict. This suggests that 
grievance cannot explain the totality of the conflicts in the Niger Delta, but it can be 
argued that greed underlies the exclusion of the minority groups from the oil wealth by the 
majority groups, as the oil wealth has not impacted the poverty of the northern region 
whose political leaders have dominated governance in Nigeria. Available data shows that 
despite the rule by the majority Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of northern Nigeria, and the 
perception that they have used the oil wealth for the benefit of their people, the Northern 
States are the poorest in the country. The 2004 poverty profile in the country listed the 6 
Northern states of Jigawa, Kebbi, Kogi, Bauchi, and Kwara as the poorest. Similarly, no 
Northern state was listed among the states that had the lowest incidence of poverty (Ibaba 
2010, 51). 
One fundamental reason advanced by Akinola (2010, 57) for deprivation of 
citizens, is the domination of the public sphere by a few elites with “particularistic” 
concerns that results in exclusion of the people. I agree, and note that one consequence of 
this is corruption, which is possibly driven by greed. But corruption which also results in 
deprivation (Ibaba and Ebiede 2008) can be a source of grievance, frustration and 
aggression. Significantly, corruption is pervasive at all levels of governance in Nigeria, a 
federation of 36 states and 774 local government councils. From the above, it is discernible 
that the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta are multidimensional. Table 1 provides some 
insight into conflict trends and conflict drivers in the region. 
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Table 1: Conflict Trends in the Niger Delta Indicating the Motivating Factors and Actors 
 
Type of Conflict Motivating/Causal Factors Actors of Conflict 
Intra-Community Conflict Triggered by disagreement 
community factions over 
ownership of land, and 
equitable distribution of oil 
industry benefits such as 
scholarships, employment, 
contract awards, and monies 
paid as compensation for 
damages 
Community factions such as 
youths, chiefs, urban and 
local elites, engaged in a 
struggle for access and 
equitable share of oil 
benefits 
Inter-Community Conflict Caused by inter-community 
struggle over benefits of the 
oil industry such as award of 
contracts, employment and 
payment of compensation for 
damage done to property. 
Community youths and 
chiefs engaged in a struggle 
for access and equitable 
share of oil benefits 
Inter-Ethnic Conflict This caused by inter-struggle 
for over benefits of the oil 
industry such as employment, 
contract awards and payment 
of compensation for damages, 
ownership of land, title of 
traditional rulers and political 
appointments  
Community youths and 
chiefs engaged in a struggle 
for access and equitable 
share of oil benefits and 
political leaders who 
manipulate the situation to 
score political gains 
Oil-Company/Community 
Conflict 
This is motivated by factors 
such as delay in the payment 
of compensation for damage 
to property, breach of 
Memorandum of 
Understanding by the oil 
companies and the patronage 
of community factions by the 
oil companies 
Community youths and 
chiefs engaged in a struggle 
for access and equitable 
share of oil benefits and 
Security personnel who are 
invited by the oil companies 
to maintain order but get 
involved due to their 
excesses 
State-Community 
Conflict 
This is caused by perceived 
deprivation, neglect and 
exclusion from the oil wealth 
Youths, chiefs, political 
leaders civil society 
organizations and militia 
groups engaged in a struggle 
for access and equitable 
share of oil benefits 
Intra-cult/Militia Group 
Conflict 
Struggle for supremacy over 
oil theft/bunkering space, and 
leadership succession 
Youth groups engaged in 
illegal oil bunkering 
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Inter-Cult/Militia Group 
Conflict 
Struggle for supremacy over 
oil theft/bunkering space 
Youth groups engaged in 
illegal oil bunkering 
Political Conflict Struggle for access and control 
of political power 
Armed political thugs, 
mainly youths and 
politicians who engage in a 
desperate struggle for 
political power due to the 
personalization of the state 
which encourages corruption 
and accumulation of wealth 
 
Source: Ibaba 2009, 565-566; Joab-Peteside 2005; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009, 7 
 
The Niger Delta conflict has experienced several phases and turned towards 
insurgency from 2005; resulting in the formation of numerous militia groups such as the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People 
Volunteer Force (NDVF), Niger Delta Volunteers (NDV), among many others (Okonta 
2006; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009, 9). The  operational strategy of these groups, which had 
the capacity to directly confront the Nigerian Military (Watts 2007), include attacks on oil 
infrastructure, disruption of oil production, kidnapping/hostage taking of oil company 
personnel and oil theft/bunkering (Ikelegbe 2006; Watts 2007; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009). 
These actions led to a decline in oil production and disruptions/delays in the development 
of oil and gas infrastructure, thus undermining energy security. 
 
The Conflict and Energy Security 
The security of energy sources in terms of production and supply is not only 
important to production, but also to national security. This explains the concerns for energy 
security threats, which include high oil prices, instability in exporting countries and threat 
of terrorism (Yergin 2006). Thus Nigeria’s actual and potential prominent role in global 
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energy needs and supplies, and the concentration of oil and gas production in the Niger 
Delta, draws attention to the implications of the conflict on energy security.  
Nigeria is ranked the largest oil producer in Africa (Akinola 2010, 1) and is also 
noted as the 15th world oil producer, and 7th top oil exporter in the world (USEIA 2008). 
Again, Nigeria exports oil to 21 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia and America as shown in 
Table 2. 
                                          Table 2: Percentage Export of Nigerian Oil 
 
Country Percentage Exported 
United States of America 42 
Canada 3 
South Africa 3 
Cote-d’Ivoire 3 
Italy 4 
Spain 5 
France 6 
Brazil 6 
India 13 
Others(Netherlands, 
American Virgin Islands, 
Japan, Ghana, Chile, 
China, Germany, 
Cameroon, South Korea, 
Portugal )                                           
16 
                                       
Source: Nigeria, Country Briefs, 2009, p.5  
 
Significantly, 10 of these countries, the United States, China, Japan, India, Germany, 
Brazil, Canada, South Korea, France, and Italy, are among the top oil consumers in the 
world (USEIA 2008). Related to this is that fact that whereas the depleted oil and gas 
reserves in the North Sea of Europe stand at 15 billion barrels and 155.6 trillion cubic feet, 
the reserves of Nigeria are 35 billion barrels and 185 trillion cubic feet respectively. 
Further, the country’s light sweet crude is easier to refine into petrol than the crude 
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produced in the Persian Gulf, Russia and Venezuela (Africa’s Oil Giant Enters Global 
League www. entrepreneur.com/tradejournals). 
Further, the country is ranked the 10th producer of natural gas, and the “estimated 
17.2 billion cubic meter of gas it flares every year is noted to be one quarter of the power 
consumption of Africa and 45 percent of the energy requirement of France, the world’s 
fourth largest economy” (Onyekonwu 2008, 17). Similarly, it is estimated that the gas 
flares in the Niger Delta “can provide 75 percent of the energy requirements in Sub-
Saharan Africa, including South Africa” (Tell 2008, 84). The proposed West Africa 
pipeline project is expected to convey gas from the Niger Delta to Ghana, Togo and Benin 
Republic, and is expected to have a full capacity of 450 cubic meters of natural gas per 
annum, on completion (Nigeria, Country Briefs, 2009, p.7).  
Similarly, the Trans-Sahara gas pipeline project is designed to supply 20 billion 
cubic meters of gas per annum to Europe by 2016 (Afrik-News 2010). Significantly, 
Europe imports 57 percent of its gas requirements, making it the largest importer of gas. 
Significantly, it is also estimated that gas consumption “would increase by 1.7 percent 
annually from about 104 trillion cubic feet in 2005 to nearly 158 trillion cubic feet in 
2030” (Niger Delta Standard 2009, 9). Nigeria also supplies electricity to neighbouring 
African countries such as Niger, and is also involved in electricity integration projects in 
the West African sub-region. One such project is the proposed 330-KV transmission line 
from Lagos (Nigeria) to Togo and the Republic of Benin (Madamombe 2005). 
Significantly, gas piped from the Niger Delta is a major source of electricity generation in 
Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria’s energy sources depend on the Niger Delta, as natural gas 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 56 
contributes 34 percent, and oil 58 percent. Hydro contributes a meager 8 percent (Nigeria, 
Country Briefs 2009, p.2).  
Attacks on gas pipelines, including six incidents between May and August 2009 
alone (Daily Champion 2009, 1; Nigerian News World 2009, 16), disrupted  gas supply to 
the  country’s electricity power plants, and the West African Pipeline Project (Adeoye 
2010, 9-10). The violence also led to drastic cuts in crude oil production and export. 
Available data shows that attacks on oil pipelines increased from 497 in 1999 to 895 in 
2004, leading to an increase in product loss from 179,000 metric tons in 2004 to 396,000 
metric tons in 2004 (Watts 2007, 639). Also the year 2006 recorded 14 militia attacks on 
oil infrastructure, as well as oil company and security personnel. This increased to 23 in 
2007 and 29 in 2008. These attacks led to an estimated loss of 25,200,000 barrels of crude 
oil valued at $56,646,424,000 (Niger Delta Technical Committee 2008, 120-121). Also the 
county’s oil exports dropped from 1.84 million barrels per day in December 2006 to 1.45 
million barrels per day in October 2009, when the amnesty offer ended. The export volume 
has since risen to 1.51 million and 1.57 million barrels per day in November and December 
2009 respectively, and 1.76 million barrels per day in June 2010 (Central Bank of Nigeria 
2010). The disruptions in oil supplies and the development of oil and gas production 
infrastructure vindicate the concern shown for the threat the violence poses to energy 
security. One of the intentions of the amnesty program is to address this concern. 
 
Reflections on Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta 
Before the 2009 amnesty declaration by the Nigerian government, several 
attempts located at three broad levels had been made to restore peace in the Niger Delta. 
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First, is development intervention by the government through the establishment of 
ministerial and extra-ministerial agencies. One such attempt was the 1.5 percent 
presidential committee which was established in 1982 to manage the 1.5 percent Mineral 
Producing Areas Development Fund. This was succeeded by the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), created in 1992, and the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) established in the year 2000. The creation of the 
Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs is also part of this intervention. The mandate of these 
agencies included the provision of social infrastructure and services for environmental 
management, particularly in the remediation of oil spill and gas flare impacted areas 
(OMPADEC 1993; Okoko, Nna, and Ibaba 2006). The neglect of the oil-producing areas 
of the Niger Delta resulted in the absence of basic social infrastructure and amenities 
such as health facilities, schools, electricity, and potable water. This condition was 
exacerbated by oil spills and gas flare which undermined the local economies largely 
based on farming and fishing. These agencies, however, had little success in addressing 
these problems, and this meant that the objective conditions which motivate conflict were 
sustained. The failure has been blamed on factors which include poor management of 
funds, poor development planning, corruption, political interference, and inadequate 
funding (Ibaba 2005; Adeyemo 2008). 
At another level of analysis, the failure of these establishments to promote peace 
and development is attributed to their inability to address crucial issues such as 
centralized federalism, political restructuring, and reforms in revenue allocation which 
are fundamental requirements for the resolution of the conflict (Tamuno 2000). Ibaba 
(2009) agrees with this view but insists that they are not as important as the lack of 
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democratization, which appears to have hindered the success of other aspects of the 
federal government’s response to the conflict. As part of this response, the federal 
government increased the derivation component of revenue allocation from 1.5 percent to 
3 percent in 1992, and from 3 percent to 13 percent in 2000.  These increases, which 
partially met demands for increase in the derivation formula to 50 percent, improved on 
the finances of the Niger Delta states. Available data shows for instance that revenue 
received by the Niger Delta state from the Federation Account rose from $866.2 million 
in 2000 to $7.1 billion in 2008. The data further indicates that the Niger states received 
$7.1 billion out of $16.5 billion allocated to the 36 states of the federation (Ibaba 2009). 
However, the increase in revenue inflow brought with it manifestations of 
elements of “resource curse” such as short-sightedness of policy makers, the weakening 
of state institutions through corruption, and the inhibition of democratization through 
political patronage, which discourages demands for democracy and political repression 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies 2008; Ross 1999). Budgetary allocations 
neglect social infrastructure and social services such as education, health facilities and 
potable water, whereas projects such as stadia, airports, and new lodges for political 
office holders are given priority. Travel allowances are inflated, and thus consume a 
substantial part of budgetary allocations. Enweremadu (2008, 448) cited the case of 
Rivers State where legislators received $5.4 million as travel allowances alone in a year. 
Ibaba (2009, 562) has also cited the case of Bayelsa State where over $92.8 million was 
budgeted for miscellaneous expenses while $5 million was set aside for Governor’s tours 
and travels in 2008. In the same year, health was allocated $84.2 million, water $3.6 
million and education $78.4 million.   
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Corruption and political patronage are also pervasive in the region. The Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria’s anti-graft agency, has accused 4 of 
the 6 governors who served from 1999-2007 of financial impropriety. Chief D.S.P. 
Alamieyeseigha, the first executive governor of Bayelsa State, was arrested in London in 
September 2005 on money laundering charges to the tune of 1.8 million pounds (Watts 
2007). He was later convicted by a Nigerian high court in 2007, after his dramatic return 
from London in November 2005. The effect of corruption in the region is that only a 
small proportion of the huge oil revenues have trickled down to the poor population. 
Despite this, the population can hardly demand democracy and good governance, partly 
because of the patron-client politics, the commoditization of violence in the electoral 
process and the associated repression and electoral fraud (Joab-Peterside 2005). Election 
fraud which is perpetrated through patron-client politics and violence has hijacked the 
power of the people to vote out corrupt and inefficient governments. Thus the region is 
denied the development and peace benefits of democracy such as the enhancement of 
development and reduction of structural violence, open and fair competition for power, 
provision of avenues for rational political discourse and settlement of conflicting social 
interests, checks and balances of governmental powers which reduce discontent, political 
participation, income re-distribution, production and funding of pubic goods, rule of law, 
and accountability and transparency in governance (Ake 1996a and 1996b; McGuire and 
Olson 1996; Brown and Hunter 2004; Diamond 2004; Samuels 2005; Ross 2006). 
Another approach to peace which preceded the amnesty program was the 2004 
cash for arms policy of the Rivers State government (one of the six state governments in 
the Niger Delta), meant to retrieve arms from cults/gangs and militias. In the build up to 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 
60 
the 2003 general elections, several groups were mobilized and armed by politicians to 
secure election victory (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2005; Joab-Peterside 2005). But 
the events which followed created deep-seated insecurity as inter and intra cult/gang, 
intra-community and inter-community conflict became frequent. The waterways became 
unsafe and attacks on oil infrastructure increased. Having linked the violence to the 
availability of arms, the government decided to retrieve arms from circulation. Those 
who had arms were motivated with compensatory payments in cash, rehabilitation, 
training, and forgiveness. The response was shocking, as a total of 1,675 assorted 
firearms were submitted. These included assault rifles, AK-47 rifles, Czech SA Vz 
58,HK C3, shotguns, light machine guns, Baretta 125, revolvers, craft weapons, pistols 
and Czech model 26 (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and Okhomina 2007, 20). 
Although the number of submitted arms was huge, the general feeling then was that only 
an infinitesimal proportion of available arms were surrendered, just as other reports 
indicated that old arms were returned to claim the monies paid, while the new arms in the 
possession of the violent groups remained intact (Human Rights Watch 2005, 20). 
Events which followed later tend to vindicate these claims, although it can be 
argued that new arms were bought. The sources of arms in the Niger Delta, identified by 
Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and Okhomina (2007, 20-21), include weapons brought 
in from war-ravaged countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone by Nigerian soldiers who 
had gone to those countries for peace keeping, and who then sold the arms to willing 
buyers such as chiefs, politicians, and criminal gangs/cult groups; weapons exchanged for 
oil by oil bunkering syndicates; weapons seized from or bought from security operatives; 
and weapons brought into the country illegally by smugglers.  
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This suggests that the accessibility to arms and their availability are central to the 
conflict. Although information on payments for arms under the program is sketchy, one 
report indicates that $2,000 was paid for each AK-47 rifle that was surrendered (Africa 
News 2009). Human Rights Watch (HRW) also reported in 2005 that the Rivers State 
government offered $1,800 for each assault rifle that was turned in. However, it is 
estimated that arms were purchased for between $570 and $2,150, (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, 
Olarinmoye, and Okhomina 2007, 19), suggesting that firearms can easily be acquired 
with monies received from government in return for surrendering arms. It can be argued 
from this standpoint that the arms for cash program ended up in mobilization rather than 
demobilization, and this partly accounts for the high intensity of resurgence in the later 
years. Further, the fundamental factors which led to the emergence of the armed groups, 
such as the manipulation of youth groups by politicians, desperate struggle for traditional 
political authority induced by payments to communities by oil companies, the use of 
youths by oil theft/ bunkering syndicates, arms leakages, and the culture of impunity 
which undermined the punishment of perpetrators of violence (HRW 2005, 4-10), were 
not addressed. 
It is deducible from all of the above that the failure of the government to tackle 
the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict, sustained it until it was shaped by 
arms to a dangerous point. Whereas the Chief Olusegun Obasanjo government was more 
militaristic in its approach to the conflict, the Alhaji Musa Yari’Adua government, after 
seeing the futility of that approach decided on the amnesty program after several 
consultations. The amnesty proclamation which was made on June 25, 2009, came into 
effect on August 6, 2009, and ended October 4, 2009, offered forgiveness to militants in 
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return for withdrawal from the creeks, arms surrender, re-integration and provision of 
source of livelihood (Adeyemi-Suenu and Inokoba 2010, 8). Unlike the cash for arms 
program of the Rivers State government, the amnesty program made provisions for those 
who accepted the pardon to be registered and camped for training, rehabilitation and 
reintegration. In addition, they were paid allowances to provide for their feeding and 
other needs. The government budgeted $63 million for this (Africa News 2009). At the 
end of the amnesty period, the amnesty implementation committee reported the surrender 
of about 15,000 militants, 2,760 assorted arms and 287, 445 variety of ammunitions (The 
Nation 2009). Since the end of the amnesty, attacks on oil infrastructure and oil company 
personnel are almost non-existent while oil production in the region has become 
reasonably stable. 
 
Interrogating the Amnesty Program 
The amnesty program has been criticized on a number of grounds. The most 
prominent is the contention that it did not follow disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) procedures. One such critique has noted: 
 DDR is typically adopted in post conflict societies, where peace 
agreements have been forged among ex-combatants who have signified a 
willingness to return to civil life. Interestingly, Nigeria offers an exception 
from the standard approach. … The conceptualization of amnesty 
underlies the structure of pre-amnesty peace negotiations, and ultimately 
defines the strategy of disarmament and the design of post-amnesty 
demobilization. It shows that the conception of amnesty as a “gift handed 
down to militants perceived primarily as criminals” is the major challenge 
to the amnesty initiative. This is evident in the non-inclusion of a specific 
strategy for addressing the roots of militancy in the amnesty program. This 
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suggests that the amnesty initiative does not differ markedly from the 
state’s preferred peace strategy of win/lose, which has underscored 
constant agitations, and the evolving dynamics of complex insurgency in 
the region. (Davidheiser and Kialee 2010, 1) 
 
The above reference emphasizes the absence of pre-amnesty negotiations and the 
signing of a peace agreement with the ex-militants as a major flaw that may truncate the 
program. The contention is that negotiations with the ex-combatants were necessary to 
define a comprehensive peace agreement which would serve as a framework for the 
implementation of the amnesty program. Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi (2010) and 
Ikelegbe (2010) agree with this, and note that the absence of negotiation has created a 
vacuum described as “the lack of participation and sense of ownership of the program by 
ex-combatants” (Davidheiser and Kialee 2010, 13). This is seen as a major threat to the 
program. However, it cannot be completely correct to conclude that there were no 
negotiations before the amnesty was proclaimed. Whereas negotiation is conventional in 
DDR, it would be wrong to ignore context when insisting on its application.  
Although the insurgency in the Niger Delta has been championed by several 
groups, their demands have been congruent as evidenced in the petitions made to the 
federal government by the different ethnic nationalities. The Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990), 
the Aklaka Declaration (1999), Bill of Rights of the Oron People (1999), Resolutions of 
the First Urhobo Economi Summit (1998) the Warri Accord (1999), and The Kaima 
Declaration (1998) are all unanimous on the demands for resource control, self-
determination, increase in derivation, and environmental protection as remedies and 
strategies for the development of the region. Essentially, the lack of development is the 
prime motive for the agitations which turned violent.  Further, numerous commissions of 
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inquiry and committees have been established to investigate the issues and recommend 
policy options. The work of these commissions and committees has been done by 
stakeholders and in consultation with stakeholders, and in many cases, decisions were 
reached by consensus. 
In September 2008, the federal government constituted the Niger Delta Technical 
Committee (NDTC) to review all past reports on the region, including the report of the 
Willinks Commission established by the colonial government in 1957. The NDTC was 
given the mandate to determine policy options that can “help the government to achieve 
sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta.” 
The NDTC submitted its report in November 2008, and made recommendations which 
center on governance and rule of law (disarmament, decommission, reintegration, 
reforms in governance and institutions), regional development (transportation, water and 
power, economic development, reclamation, environment and sustainable development), 
and compact with stakeholders. Two things are noteworthy here. First, amnesty was a key 
recommendation of the NDTC. Second, the recommendations of the NDTC were based 
on the reports of previous committees and commissions (such as the Belgore Report 
1992; the Etiebet Report 1994; the Poopola Report 1998; the Ogomudia Report 2001; the 
Presidential Panel on National Security 2003; the National Political Reform Conference 
Report 2005; and the Report of the Presidential Council on the Social and Economic 
Development of the Coastal States of the Niger Delta 2006) and the different petitions of 
the various ethnic nationalities of the region, and thus, it was unanimously accepted in the 
Niger Delta as the road map to peace and development in the region.  
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Given this, I argue that the issue of negotiation is not as important as the failure to 
address the fundamental issue of development neglect which triggered and sustained the 
conflict. Importantly, the promise by the federal government to address the development 
of the region and related issues ensured the acceptance of the amnesty by the armed 
groups. Thus the government has only implemented one aspect of the Committee’s 
recommendations which emerged by consensus. The implementation of the other policy 
recommendations will most likely prevent the resurgence of violence in the region and 
thus secure energy needs and supply.  
This view is predicated on addressing the challenges posed by the lack of 
democratization and capacity on the part of the political leadership to pursue the common 
good. Corruption, the lack of transparency and accountability in governance, the 
desperate struggle for political power, commoditization of violence in the electoral 
process, political repression and the neglect of development, which have contributed to 
the conflict, are consequences of the lack of democracy and good governance. This is 
also true of ethnicity-based political domination and irresponsive governance. The 
Willinks Commission Report (1958, 30) made this point when it noted that “the best 
protection for a remote territory against governmental neglect or discrimination is the 
voting power of its inhabitants…the development of democratic institutions… can 
strengthen this safeguard.” Election rigging, which makes votes not to count, has robbed 
the country and the Niger Delta of these benefits. Significantly, election rigging has 
become an integral part of the Nigerian electoral process (Alapiki 1995; Ibrahim 2006; 
Bratton 2008).  
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One concern for the amnesty program is speculation that militia groups withheld 
some of their firearms, thus making the region prone to the resurgence of violence. But 
even if this speculation is true (as the assassination of Soboma George, former militant 
commander in Rivers State, on August 24, 2010 and the October 1, 2010 Abuja bomb 
blasts suggest), the use of the arms can only be encouraged by undemocratic conditions. 
The crisis plaguing the national economy is also a major challenge to the success of the 
amnesty program. Corruption and the associated poor management of funds and 
resources, the energy and infrastructure crisis, and the global economic recession have 
knocked down the Nigerian economy. The country generates only 3.7 megawatts of about 
20,000 megawatts of its electricity needs, imports refined petroleum products even 
though it is OPEC’s 6th largest producer, the poverty rate is over 70 percent, and youth 
unemployment is about 49 percent (Channels Television 2010).  
This condition threatens the success of the education, training and rehabilitation 
components of the amnesty. The question is, Will the educated, trained and rehabilitated 
militants operate in a different economy? The answer is obviously no, and herein lies the 
problem. The lack of employment for these repentant militants may incite them to 
violence. Further, the high youth unemployment put at 49 percent (Channels Television 
2010) indicates that there are several other youths who may be prone to violence. 
Significantly, present policies are not addressing this effectively, just as the education, 
training, and rehabilitation components of the amnesty program have thus far neglected 
the youths who did not carry arms against the state. This tends to create a perception that 
it pays to be violent, and may instigate further violence if not attended to. It is proper to 
argue here that the economic crisis may have created a “frustration-aggression trap” that 
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tends towards a cycle of violence. Escaping this trap is therefore essential for the success 
of the amnesty program. 
In an earlier section, the paper noted the application of the greed and grievance 
explanation of violence to the Niger Delta conflict. The discussion here underscores the 
relevance of these theories in the analysis of the Niger Delta conflict, and draws attention 
to the fact that the resolution of greed and grievance is central to peace building in the 
region. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined the interface between militia violence in Nigeria’s Niger 
Delta, the amnesty granted the armed groups by the Nigerian government, and energy 
security. The objective of the paper was to highlight the importance of the success of the 
amnesty program to global energy security. The study reviewed the theoretical 
explanations of the conflict and noted that a single theory can hardly explain the different 
settings of conflicts in the region. Thus the paper emphasized the integration of the greed, 
grievance and frustration-aggression theories that have dominated conflict analysis in the 
Delta. Thus the variations of conflict such as oil company-community conflict, intra-
community conflict, inter-community conflict, community-state conflict, intra-cult/gangs 
and militia conflict and inter-cults/gangs and militia conflicts were located in these 
contexts, and the analysis highlighted the resolution of greed and grievances as a major 
requirement for peacebuilding in the area. 
Nigeria’s strategic role in global energy needs was discussed, and Nigeria’s 
potential and actual importance to gas needs in Europe and Africa, the countries supply of 
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crude oil to 21 countries in Europe, America, Asia and Africa, and electricity supplies to 
some African countries were emphasized. The paper reflected the impact of the violence 
on energy infrastructure and brought to the fore how the violence endangers energy 
security. The disruptions of gas supplies to energy plants in Nigeria and the West African 
gas pipeline and the drastic cuts in oil production and exports were cited as examples of 
the implications of the violence for energy security. 
The amnesty program was initiated to restore peace and ensure unfettered oil and 
gas production in the region. It set out to retrieve arms from the creeks of the region, 
provide means of livelihood and forgiveness to individuals who took up arms against the 
state and attacked and destroyed energy infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines. The 60 
day amnesty which ended on October 4, 2009, has brought relative peace to the region as 
evidenced by the near absence of attacks on oil and gas production infrastructure and 
kidnapping/hostage taking of oil company personnel, and increase in oil production and 
export. But the program has been criticized for not adhering to the principles of DDR, 
particularly for not being preceded by a negotiation framework. This is seen as a vacuum 
that can undermine its success. While I agree with this, I make a case that the argument 
ignores the Niger Delta context. My contention is that it cannot be entirely correct to 
conclude that there were no negotiations before the amnesty program was proclaimed by 
the federal government.  
The point is that before the amnesty was proclaimed, several negotiations through 
committees and commissions involving stakeholders had been done. Further, the different 
nationalities had documented petitions to the federal government. Meanwhile, the   
recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, which included the amnesty 
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program and which was widely accepted as a road map to conflict resolution and peace-
building in the region, consulted and reflected issues raised in the  committees and 
commissions which preceded it, in addition to the petitions of the ethnic nationalities. 
Given this, the issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure of the government 
to tackle the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict. The lack of democratization, 
lack of capacity of political leaders to pursue public good, and the crisis plaguing the 
national economy are challenges to the success of the amnesty program. To enhance the 
success of the amnesty program and secure the region and energy security, the  deepening 
of democratic practice to ensure that votes count in Nigerian elections is the most likely 
way out of the conflict. 
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